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Abstract
This paper addresses the argument from ‘contextualist cases’—
such as for instance DeRose’s Bank cases—to attributor contex-
tualism. It is argued that these cases do not decide the case
against invariantism and that the debate between contextualists
and invariantists will have to be settled on broader theoretical
grounds.
Classical invariantism (CI) in epistemology is the view that the truth
of an attribution of knowledge of a proposition to an agent depends
only on the agent’s doxastic and epistemic position towards the pro-
position and the proposition’s truth value. As opposed to that, attrib-
utor contextualism (AC) claims that the truth of a knowledge attri-
bution depends in addition on facts about the conversational context
in which the attribution of knowledge is made. Champions of AC,
perhaps most notably Keith DeRose (1992, 2009) and Stewart Cohen
(1999), have claimed that the following argument supports AC vis-à-
vis CI. Consider first this story:
K-LOW. Ernie, Bert and Grover are on their way to L.A. airport to
take a flight to New York. Grover is sitting in the back of the
car listening to music on his Ipod. Ernie and Bert receive a text
message from a friend who asks whether they will stop over in
Chicago and suggests to meet for coffee if they do. Not much
hangs on whether they meet this friend: they have recently seen
him and are due to see him again in a few weeks. Having
realised that they simply don’t know, Bert says, “I remember
that Grover took a copy of the itinerary with him. We might
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ask him.” Ernie agrees, “Yes, let’s ask him, he’ll know whether
the flight has a layover in Chicago.”
Contextualists observe (a) that it is highly plausible that Ernie’s at-
tribution of knowledge here is conversationally appropriate and (b) that
there is a strong intuition that what he says is true.
Now (try for a moment to) forget what I just said and consider
this story:
K-HIGH. Ernie, Bert and Grover are on their way to L.A. airport to
take a flight to New York. Grover is sitting in the back of the
car listening to music on his Ipod. Ernie and Bert receive a text
message from their boss telling them that they are to pick up
certain documents at the airport in Chicago and that it is of ut-
most importance that they do so—the future of the company
depends on it. Ernie and Bert know that New York flights of-
ten have layovers in Chicago. Having realised that they simply
don’t know whether their flight has a layover there, Ernie says,
“I remember that Grover took a copy of the itinerary with him.
We might ask him.” But, as Bert points out, the itinerary may
contain a misprint or they may have changed the schedule at
last minute. In view of this, Ernie concedes, “I guess you’re
right. Let’s not ask Grover. He doesn’t know whether the flight
has a layover in Chicago either.”1
Contextualists notice (a) that it is highly plausible that Ernie’s denial
of knowledge here is conversationally appropriate and (b) that there is
a strong intuition that what he says is true.
Such intuitions of conversational propriety and truth, claim con-
textualists, is excellent evidence that the relevant claims are in fact
true. That is to say, however, that K-LOW and K-HIGH constitute ev-
idence that both Ernie’s attribution of knowledge in K-LOW and his
denial of knowledge in K-HIGH are both true. But now recall that,
1 K-LOW and K-HIGH are in essence Stewart Cohen’s (1999) Airport case.
DeRose (1992, 2009) has used a different pair of cases, his Bank cases, for the same
purpose. Notice that my versions of the cases feature attributions of knowledge
whether P. This should be harmless, however, for two reasons: first, knowledge
whether P is very plausibly constituted either by knowledge that P (in case P is
true) or by knowledge that not-P (in case not-P is true). As a result, if CI fails for
attributions of knowledge whether P, there is every reason to think that it must
also fail for attributions of knowledge that P. Second, the cases could, given a gen-
erous investment of space, be converted into cases of knowledge-that attributions.
For a recipe how to do this see DeRose (2009: 62-3).
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according to CI, whether Grover knows that the flight has a layover
in Chicago depends only on whether his doxastic and epistemic posi-
tion towards this proposition is strong enough and on its truth-value.
Since all of these factors remain constant across K-LOW and K-HIGH,
CI will predict that either Ernie’s attribution of knowledge in K-LOW
or his denial of knowledge in K-HIGH must be false. Since, as contex-
tualists argue, AC can secure the result that both Ernie’s attribution
of knowledge in K-LOW and his denial of knowledge in K-HIGH are
true, cases like K-LOW and K-HIGH provide reason to favour AC
over CI. In fact, DeRose even suggests that such cases provide “the
best grounds for accepting contextualism.” (2009: 47)
But how good is this argument, really? Consider the following
story:
A-LOW. Statler and Waldorf, a couple of committed art aficionados,
have just arrived at their friend Kermit’s house, who had re-
cently deceased. Kermit’s living room features a painting that
bears the signature of Gonzo, a very famous artist. For Statler
and Waldorf not much hinges on whether it is a Gonzo: they
don’t intend to buy the work, they don’t consider whether it’s
worth taking the risk to steal it etc. For the first time in years,
Statler and Waldorf enter Kermit’s living room. Statler imme-
diately notices the painting, sees that it bears the signature of
Gonzo and says to Waldorf: “Look, it’s a Gonzo. I didn’t know
Kermit had such good taste.”
In my books (a) it is highly plausible that Statler’s attribution of au-
thorship is conversationally appropriate and (b) there is a strong intu-
ition that what Statler says is true.
Now (try for a moment to) forget what I just said and consider
this story:
A-HIGH. Statler and Waldorf, a couple of committed art aficiona-
dos, have just arrived at their friend Kermit’s house, who had
recently deceased. Kermit’s living room features a painting that
bears the signature of Gonzo, a very famous artist. For Statler
and Waldorf it’s of crucial importance whether it is a Gonzo.
Kermit’s belongings are up for sale and Statler and Waldorf
are considering buying the piece for a considerable amount of
money. As they are deliberating whether to go ahead with the
deal, Statler points out that Gonzo is one of the most widely
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forged artists and that not long ago there was a big scandal con-
cerning forged Gonzos in the area. Waldorf adds that Kermit
never knew a lot about art and that due to his trusting nature
he was exactly the kind of person who would have fallen for
such a scam. Statler then draws attention to the fact that the
execution of the painting is unusually sloppy for Gonzo and
Statler points out that the painting is stylistically and themati-
cally very different from other works by Gonzo from the period
during which, according to the date on the painting, it was cre-
ated. In view of the evidence, Statler concludes: “This is not a
Gonzo.”
Again, in my books, (a) it is highly plausible that Statler’s denial
of authorship is conversationally appropriate and (b) there is a strong
intuition that what Statler says is true.
Given that such intuitions of conversational propriety and truth
constitute excellent evidence that the relevant claims are in fact true,
we should now have excellent evidence that Statler’s attribution of
authorship in A-LOW and his denial of authorship in A-HIGH are
both true. Notice that if they are both true, any invariantist account
of attributions of authorship according to which the truth of an at-
tribution of authorship depends only on who created the piece must
be false. However, I take it, hardly anyone will be tempted to reject
invariantism about attributions of authorship on this basis. The intu-
itions of conversational propriety and truth in A-LOW and A-HIGH
do not move us away from invariantism in the direction of contextu-
alism. In consequence, the anti-invariantist import of the argument
from K-LOW and K-HIGH will be weakened. It will be even fur-
ther weakened if, as I will argue momentarily, invariantists can give
parallel accounts of the intuitions in both pairs of cases.
Let’s suppose that the piece is by Gonzo so that Statler’s attribu-
tion of authorship in A-LOW is true, and his denial in A-HIGH false.
One crucial question then concerns how we can explain Statler’s mis-
take. I think that there are two crucial ingredients in the correct
explanation: first, compared to A-LOW, the higher stakes at issue in
A-HIGH make it reasonable for him to consider and base his judgement on
a wider range of evidence bearing on the question whether the painting is
a Gonzo. While in A-LOW it is entirely reasonable for Statler to con-
sider and base his judgement solely on the fact that the piece bears
Gonzo’s signature, given the higher stakes at issue in A-HIGH, it is
also reasonable there for Statler to consider and base his judgement
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on further evidence bearing on the question such as how the claim
that the painting is by Gonzo fits with with other relevant facts he
knows. However, second, the additional evidence considered is mislead-
ing, it points Statler away from truth, in the direction of falsehood.
The explanation of his mistake also serves to explain our intuition of
conversational propriety and truth. Just like Statler we, the evaluators
of the case, take the evidence at face value—naturally as the descrip-
tion of the case provides no reason not to do so. Our intuitions go
awry because they are guided by misleading evidence.
Now, consider moderate invariantism, according to which the
doxastic and epistemic standards for knowledge are attainably low.
Suppose, furthermore, Grover satisfies these standards and his belief
is also true so that it qualifies as knowledge in both K-LOW and K-
HIGH. I think that moderate invariantists can avail themselves of an
explanation of the mistake in K-HIGH parallel to the one just pro-
vided for A-HIGH: first, compared to K-LOW, the higher stakes opera-
tive in K-HIGH make it reasonable for Ernie to consider and base his judge-
ment on a wider range of evidence bearing on the question whether Grover
knows. While in K-LOW it is entirely reasonable for Ernie to consider
and base his judgement as to whether Grover knows solely on the
basis of fact that he has an itinerary, in K-HIGH it becomes reason-
able for him to consider and base his judgement as to whether Grover
knows on further evidence bearing on the question such as whether
he has eliminated all error possibilities that, given the importance of
the matter, appear relevant. The fact that he hasn’t eliminated some
apparently relevant error possibilities constitutes evidence that his
belief does not qualify as knowledge. However, second, the additional
evidence considered is misleading, it points Ernie away from truth, in
the direction of falsehood. Again, the explanation of his mistake also
serves to explain our intuition of conversational propriety and truth.
Just like Ernie we, the evaluators of the case, take the evidence at
face value—naturally as the description of the case provides no rea-
son not to do so. Our intuitions go awry because they are guided by
misleading evidence.
Some may be tempted to object that the two pairs of cases aren’t
analogous. After all, isn’t it the case when we consider K-LOW and
K-HIGH together, the intuitions of propriety and truth remain, while
if we consider A-LOW and A-HIGH together, the intuitions of propri-
ety and truth disappear? I am not convinced. When I consider K-
LOW and K-HIGH together and manage to convince myself that the
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intuitions in K-LOW are on the right track, I am tempted to regard
the error possibility at issue in K-HIGH as simply irrelevant. And if
I manage to convince myself that the error possibility in K-HIGH is
relevant, I am tempted to think that the attribution of knowledge in
K-LOW is simply false. I agree that my intuitions may not be worth
much here (as I have fairly strong invariantist inclinations). It is note-
worthy, however, that even contextualists concede as much. Here is
DeRose:
If I were presented with the high- and low-standards cases
together, then the pressure to give the same verdict about
whether the subject in question knows in the two cases
would be great—and greater than is the pressure to rule
that one or the other of the claims made within the cases
(that the subject ‘knows’ in [K-LOW], and doesn’t ‘know’
in [K-HIGH]) must be false. (DeRose 2009: 49, n.2)
In view of these considerations, DeRose (2009: 49) himself urges that
the cases should be considered separately.2 Given that he is right on
this score, we need not fear that the cases are disanalogous in the
way envisaged by the objection.
What shall we make of all this? Well, we have two accounts of
cases like K-LOW and K-HIGH before us: one attributor contextual-
ist, the other (moderate) invariantist. The contextualist account, let
us suppose, gives a fully charitable account of our intuitions about
these cases. It predicts that both speakers speak truly. As opposed
to that, the invariantist account tells us that the speaker in K-LOW
speaks the truth while the speaker in K-HIGH speaks falsely. Con-
textualists find it desirable that the intuitions are accounted for in a
fully charitable way and claim an advantage for their view. How-
ever, as we have seen, invariantists might respond that they don’t see
that a charitable account is required. After all the cases are, as far as
they are concerned at any rate, relevantly analogous to other cases
for which we expressly don’t want a fully charitable such account.
So, how do we decide which account to adopt? Perhaps we might
say that when we have two accounts of a set of intuitions and all else
is equal we should opt for the more charitable one. (In other words,
even if we can’t use the cases to talk an invariantist out of his position,
there is reason to favour contextualism in the sense that it is the view
2 Note that this is the reason why, before advancing to the second of each pair
of cases, I asked you to (try to) forget my description of the first one.
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a neutral person has reason to adopt.) But then the invariantist might
call into doubt whether all else is really equal here. For starters, it
has been claimed and even conceded by some contextualists that CI
has default plausibility. Thus, Patrick Rysiew writes:
[W]e seem, if anything, to be ‘intuitive invariantists’. As
one leading contextualist [i.e. Cohen 1999: 78] says, many
“resist [the contextualist] thesis — some fiercely. More-
over, those who do accept the thesis, generally do so only
as a result of being convinced by philosophical reflection.”
(Rysiew 2009, §3)
If this is correct, it is not clear that we start from a neutral position.
If we don’t, if we start from invariantism, and need to be talked out
of it, it is not clear that the argument from cases like K-LOW and K-
HIGH will do the job. Perhaps even more significantly, CI, or at any
rate, the version of moderate CI outlined above, is (all else equal) sim-
pler than its contextualist rival. After all, the explanatory principle it
invokes in order to explain our intuitions in these cases—the speaker
makes a mistake due to misleading evidence—is one that any theory
of knowledge will have to invoke at some point. To see this consider
the following case: A tells me that S knows that P and, trusting A,
I judge (and perhaps later assert) that S knows that P. However, S
doesn’t even believe P. Here A’s testimony constitutes misleading
evidence that S knows that P, which explains my mistaken judge-
ment (and assertion). As opposed to that, contextualists propose to
invoke a new explanatory resource (a contextualist semantics) in or-
der to account for these cases. The present version of invariantism
makes recourse to fewer explanatory resources and is thus simpler
than its contextualist rival. Does this mean that CI is preferable to
AC after all? I don’t think it shows quite as much. For suppose that
AC outperformed CI when it comes to other epistemological prob-
lems or perhaps CI can solve certain problems only by complicating
its story where AC needn’t. In this way, it might still turn out that
AC is preferable to CI. What I think does transpire is that the debate
between contextualists and invariantists won’t be decided on the ba-
sis of cases like K-LOW and K-HIGH, that the argument that such
cases favour AC over CI doesn’t go through. We need to compare the
relative merits of the two views on a broader scale. I am optimistic
for invariantism. But, of course, I could not hope to argue as much
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here.3
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